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Abstract  
This paper examines premium determination of voluntary automobile 
insurance policy and risk classification under a heavily regulated rating 
system in Taiwan. We investigate the distribution of actual premium and pure 
premium, based on unique data to test if premium reflect appropriate 
gender-age factor. The reasonableness of loading and the difference in driving 
exposure between policyholder and driver are investigated for three different 
types of policy. An adjustment of gender-age premium coefficients is called 
for.   
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1. Introduction  
Premium determination is a fundamental task in the automobile insurance 
industry. To achieve the goal of solvency and fairness, insurers are required to 
perform ratemaking through categorization by using available information. 
However, premium discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as 
age, gender, nationality and race is a debatable equity issue in terms of the 
constitutional right and actuarial fairness. Butler et al. (1988), for example, 
provide evidence that auto insurers overcharge most women in U.S. insurance 
market. Alternatively, Harrington and Doerpinghaus (1993) indicate, if there is 
a restriction on rate classification in the auto insurance market, the cost of risk 
by distorting incentives for claim settlement might increase and the provision 
of coverage seriously weaken. 
Contrary to the past debate of restriction on rate classification in other 
countries, Taiwan adopts stringent regulation on all the aspects of automobile 
insurance business, including the minimal capital requirement, designation and 
approval of policy, rating system and even the basic premium. Authority in 
Taiwan officially mandates rating formulas and standard of risk classification 
based on age and gender, in addition to the bonus-malus system. The insured 
generally face the choices of varied coverage- premium menu a la Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976), that is, higher coverage with higher premium or lower 
coverage with lower premium. Under such a special environment, what 
making an insurer different from others are competitions in services and 
underwriting in terms of loss ratio?    
The objective of this paper is to explore the relationships among 
automobile insurance rating system and risk classification in Taiwan using 
voluntary automobile vehicle damage insurance data. We are attempting to 
examine if consumers pay rates that are causally related to losses. Specifically, 
we investigate premium determination in Taiwan auto insurance market by 
focusing on age factor, loading and pure premium.  
2. Literature 
The literature of risk classification and rating can be divided into two 
broad approaches: actuarial and economic analyses. The focus of actuarial 
literature is the choice of estimation method of pure premium. Chang and 
Fairley (1979), Sant (1980), Weisberg and Tomberlin (1982) are typical 
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examples, among others. On the other hand, economic literature concentrates 
on the efficiency of classification and rating system. Early studies since Hoy 
(1982), risk classification issues have been focused on the classified cost and 
the existence of efficient equilibrium. Although Hoy (1982) provides 
ambiguous results concerning the efficiency consequences of permitting risk 
classification, Crocker and Snow (1986) show that any market equilibrium 
with costless categorization is Pareto dominating the equilibrium in which 
categorization is not allowed. However, when the acquisition of information is 
costly, the market can be an efficient mechanism without categorization.   
Bond and Crocker (1991) claim that the attainment of first-best 
allocations may be permitted if insurers classify risks on the basis of 
endogenous categorization. Although they concern the insured’s voluntary 
consumption of products correlated with underlying loss propensities, the 
same argument can be applied to the choice of insurance policy option.  
In the early debate, Harrington and Doerpinghaus (1993) examine 
efficiency consequences of regulation for restricting market classification in 
the auto insurance market.  They argue if different market premiums are 
equal to marginally expected costs of coverage for each risk, then these 
premiums would not only provide the insured with incentives for reducing the 
cost of risk but also insurers with incentives for accurate classification to 
obtain information. When risk classification is restricted, the average cost of 
coverage increases. Thus, the average premium without classification would 
exceed the premium with classification due to covering the expected costs for 
insurers.  
3. Automobile Insurance Rating System in Taiwan   
Comparing with the long history of insurance industry in Western 
countries, automobile insurance in Taiwan, first introduced in 1968, has not 
been well established until the recent decades. Since the mid-1990, the 
government has heavily regulated the rating system of automobile insurance in 
Taiwan. For example, a new rating system for vehicle damage coverage was 
launched on July 1, 1996 and the law of compulsory automobile liability 
insurance adopted in 1998. Authority determines all the pricing formulas and 
the weight of rating factors. (The Non-life Insurance Association conducted 
the work under the authorization of Ministry of Finance.) Even the loading 
factor was not permitted to be freely adjusted based on insurer’s condition 
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until 2002. Since all the insurers comply with the same operating rules and 
assume the obligation to submit monthly report on every automobile insurance 
transaction, the available data are consistent and abundant for our study.     
In this paper, we focus on the analysis of private automobile insurance for 
vehicle damage coverage. There are three major types of coverage for 
damages to vehicles: comprehensive (form A), comprehensive (form B), and 
moving collision coverage. As shown in Table 1, the comprehensive (form A) 
policy, sold with compulsory increasing per-claim deductibles, covers all of 
the specified risks; the moving collision policy, sold with no deductibles, 
covers only one specific risk. In the last row, the values show the basic 
premiums corresponding to the appropriate coverage. As expected, more 
coverage (or no deductible) requires higher premium.        
 
In fact, the premiums of vehicle damage coverage for all the policy 
options are calculated by using an official formula: 
                            I  *  M  *  BP  *  L  P =                       (1) 
where   
P: premium 
BP: basic premium 
M: manufactured coefficient  
I: inured coefficient  
L: the ceiling of loading factor permitted by authority (= 1.35)  
 
In the above formula, manufactured coefficient is closely related to the 
vehicle age and type. The insured coefficient is composed of two parts: 
immutable characteristics (gender and age) and driving (claim) records. Table 
2 shows the gender-age coefficients of various ages for male and female, 
respectively. For the same age, male has higher pricing coefficient than female, 
ranging from 9% (elder) to 19% (younger).   
 
4. Data and Methodology   
    We obtained the entire data set of private automobile vehicle damage 
insurance contracts in Taiwan for years 2003 and 2004. These two full 
calendar years of transaction records allow us to build a data set showing 
claim distribution in 2003 policy year. There were 403,979 policies with 
69,367 claims including three major types of coverage for damages to vehicles 
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as described in Table 1.   
 According to gender-age coefficients in Table 2, for a given age, males 
have a higher pricing coefficient than females, with the difference ranging 
from 9% for older drivers to 19% for younger drivers. As a matter of fact, 
most automobile insurance policies are purchased under the name of a female 
family member to echo the difference in gender coefficients for males and 
females. This phenomenon brings us the motivation to test the following 
hypotheses: (a) does premium reflect appropriate gender-age factor? (b) Is 
loading reasonable for all types of coverage? (c) Is there any difference in 
driving exposure between policyholder and driver?    
To investigate the appropriateness of premium by age, we first calculate 
pure premium by multiplying average loss ratio with claim amount for each 
age. The pure premium is then compared with actual premium. Similar 
procedures are applied to demonstrate loading distribution and driving 
exposure between policyholder and driver.  
From the viewpoint of traditional insurance theories, the premium 
charged by insurers from policyholders could be broadly divided into pure 
premium and loading expense, as shown in (1). The “loading” in (1) represents 
a multiple of loading over pure premium. On the other hand, pure premium is 
the claim each policy incurred on insurers, which is also the product of claim 
frequency per policy and claim severity.   
 
(2)                           loading)1Severity)( Claim*Frequency (Claim                
 loading)(1policy  per  Claims Incurred               
loading)(1 Premium PurePremium
+=
+=
+=
   
 
To address the pricing strategies adopted by insurers for different 
policyholders in terms of coverage type, age, and gender, this article 
incorporates the data of insurance policies and posterior claims to generate 
average premium, pure premium, and loading for different policyholders.    
In the part of analysis, extra attention should be paid to the fact that pure 
premium and loading in equation (2) are insurers’ anterior estimation based on 
past experiences when they price insurance policies. The pure premium and 
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loading analyzed in the article is the posterior actuarial figures calculated by 
the actual policy data, such as the amount of premium paid by and claim 
requested by different policyholders, in order to reflect the pure premium and 
loading actually incurred on different policyholders after they make their 
insurance claims (or no any reimbursement is made).    
According to equation (2) and the above theoretical bases, the formulas 
of actuarial average premium, pure premium, and loading of any policyholders 
would be as follows:    
Average Premium = Average Pure Premium (1 + loading)              (3)   
where    
Average Pure Premium = [Sum of (Paid Claims and Estimated Unpaid 
Claims)] / Number of Policies                   
  (4)   
Loading = [Average Premium/ Average Pure Premium] – 1   (5)              
 
5. Empirical Results – Individual Policy    
 Table 3 shows average premium, average pure premium, and loading 
generated from different coverage types. To analyze the variance in statistic 
distribution of average premium, average pure premium, and loading from 
various coverage types, we thereby divide these policies into four major 
categories and incorporate the data of insurance policies and posterior claims 
from the four different coverage types into the above equations (2)~(5). As 
shown in Table 2, there is a significant difference among the average premium, 
average pure premium, and loading in the actuarial results generated, with the 
biggest variance in Coverage A and Coverage C. The average premium in 
Coverage A is 47441.64, roughly five times as much as that of Coverage C, 
10146.93. Meanwhile, the average pure premium in Coverage A is 15569.32, 
roughly nine times as much as that of Coverage C, 1750.57. However, the 
loading in Coverage A is 2.04712, only half as much as that of Coverage C, 
4.79634.  
Fig.1 shows the difference of average premium and average pure 
premium among different coverage types in terms of policyholders’ age. After 
confirming the existence of significant difference in average premium, average 
pure premium, and loading among four different types of coverage, we further 
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divide the policies under the same formula by age and gender. We then 
incorporate the classification of age and gender into the data of policies and 
posterior claims to explore if there is any pricing difference. As shown in Fig. 
1, the average premium of four types of coverage are all in an L shape, 
suggesting that the average premium paid by the policyholders under the age 
of 35 is relatively higher and those over 35 is relatively lower and stable. In 
addition, only those elder over 60 have a downward trend in Coverage C and 
Coverage B with or without deductible. Besides, after comparing average 
premium with average pure premium, we find there is an overcharge of 
average premium paid by the policyholders under 35, with Coverage A and 
Coverage C having the most overcharge, which is roughly seven times as 
much as that of average pure premium.  
Fig. 2 shows the difference in average premium and average pure 
premium among different coverage types at different gender and age. The 
results indicate that the average premium paid by policyholders under the age 
of 35 is relatively higher and apparently male policyholders incur more 
unreasonable overcharge of premium. Fig. 2 presents the examples of two 
different coverage types, Coverage B no deductible and Coverage C.  
In addition to the above analysis of average premium and average pure 
premium, Fig. 1 demonstrates the loading paid by policyholders at different 
age for different coverage types based on the formula of equation (5). Fig. 3 
shows that the highest loading is around 500% for Coverage C and around 
200% for other coverage. It is easy to see that all of the actual loadings are 
significantly higher than the maximum value (135%) which is permitted by 
the government authority.   
6. Empirical Results -- Grouped Policies    
The analytic results of premium and loading in the first part of empirical 
study in this paper prove that the premium and insurers’ loading expense 
indicate significant difference by coverage types, policyholders’ age and 
gender. In other words, coverage types, age, and gender are the major factors 
that affect premium determination in Taiwan’s vehicle insurance market. Such 
actuarial outcome could raise the question whether the pricing of insurance 
policy is reasonable. We will examine this question in the second part of 
empirical study.    
From equation (1), we take logarithms to obtain regression model in 
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equation (6). We use the group data to do the test in order to solve the problem 
of policies with no claims, where each group has the same number of claims. 
Thus, the explanatory variables contain the average manufactured coefficient 
of the group and average insured coefficient of group, while the explained 
variables are the average pure premium of the group. The descriptive statistics 
of grouping data is shown in Table 4.      
 
Regression Model：     
                                         (AM)ln  c    (AI)ln  b    a  (PP)ln ++=          
(6)   
 
group oft coefficien edmanufactur average  AM
 group oft coefficien insured average  AI
premium pure  PP
=
=
=
  
From the equation (6), the intercept indicates the size of basic premium. 
The intercepts shown in Table 5 is 7.8704 for Coverage C and significantly 
exceed 9 for other coverage types. Thus, these results imply that the basic 
premium for these four coverage types is away above a normal range, the same 
result as the above analysis concerning loading factor.  
For the second step, we then examine whether the coefficients of lnAI 
and lnAM are equal to 1 simultaneously. From Table 5, we find the 
coefficients of lnAI and lnAM for Coverage A, Coverage B with no 
Deductible, and Coverage C are significantly different from 1, suggestting that 
the factors of manufactured coefficient and insured coefficient fail to reflect 
the real situation of claims of policyholders. In other words, the premium 
based on mandatory formula (1) for varies coverage do not consistent with the 
actual observations. However, the coefficients of lnAI an lnAM for Coverage 
B with Deductible are insignificantly different from 1, implying that the 
mandatory formula set by the government authority is applicable for Coverage 
B with Deductible.  
7. Conclusion  
To investigate the appropriateness of premium determined by official 
formula, this paper compare the official parameters with observed ones. We 
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first calculate pure premium by multiplying average claim frequency times the 
average severity of the claims for each policy type and age. The pure premium 
is then compared with actual premium. Similar procedures are applied to 
demonstrate loading distribution and driving exposure between policyholder 
and driver.  
Our empirical evidence indicates that the youngest policyholders do not 
have high loss exposure that would be anticipated by considering the table of 
gender-age coefficients. In other words, the youngest are overcharged for more 
than four times of the pure premium. In addition, the mandatory formula for 
premium is not designed for the coverage types except for Coverage B with 
Deductible. Thus, to fully reflect the real situation of claims of policyholders, 
an adjustment of gender-age premium coefficients is needed.   
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Table 1: Four Types of Coverage for Property Damages to Vehicles  
Insured Perils 
Comprehensive 
(Form A) 
Comprehensive 
(Form B) 
Comprehensive 
(Form B) –  
No deductible 
Two-Car 
Collision –  
No deductible 
Rollover Yes Yes Yes  
Lightening Yes Yes Yes  
Fire (Explosion) Yes Yes Yes  
Flying Objects Yes Yes Yes  
Moving Collision Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Collision Yes Yes Yes  
Vandalism Yes    
Non-Excluded 
Unknown Perils Yes 
   
Deductibles (1000 
NT$) 3/5/7 3/5/7 0 0 
Basic Premium 
(NT$) 2001 47,096 23,119 25,433 11,918 
 
Table 2 Gender-Age Coefficients Used in Rating System 
Gender 
Pricing Coefficient 
Age 
Male Female 
Age under 20 1.89 1.70 
Age 20 above but under 25 1.74 1.57 
Age 25 above but under 30 1.15 1.04 
Age 30 above but under 60 1.00 0.90 
Age 60 above but under 70 1.07 0.96 
Age 70 above 1.07 0.96 
 
 
 12
Table 3 : Average Premium and Pure premium by Coverage Type          
 
Coverage Type Coverage A
Coverage B 
With 
deductible 
Coverage B 
No deductible
Coverage C 
Number of 
Policies 
14835 38101 146592 109368 
Male Female 5244 9591 12621 25480 36447 110145 38397 70971 
Number of Claims 5013 11781 50205 7394 
Male Female 1750 3263 3880 7901 11953 38252 2645 4749 
Average Premium 47441.64 24006.25 24503.15 10146.93 
Average     
Pure Premium  
15569.32 8344.79 7725.20 1750.57 
Loading    2.04712 1.87680 2.17185 4.79634 
 
 
Table 4: The Descriptive Statistics of Grouping Data     
Coverage Type Coverage A
Coverage B  
No 
Deductible 
Coverage B 
With 
Deductible 
Coverage 
C  
Number of Policies 14835 146592 38101 109368 
Number of Groups 109 1004 256 148 
Max 314  2228  579 1573  
Min 76  24  31  39  
Number of 
Policies per 
Group  Ave 136.10 146.01 148.83 738.97 
Max 49  54 51  51  
Min 43  47  44  44  
Number of  
Claims per 
Group  
Ave 46 50 46 50 
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Table 5: The Results of Regression Analysis by Grouping Policies        
Variable Coverage A
Coverage B 
No 
Deductible 
Coverage B 
With 
Deductible 
Coverage C 
 Intercept (It)  9.8693 9.5833 9.3433 7.8704 
Theoretical  
Value (TV)   
11.0600 10.4439 10.3490 9.6859 
P{It=TV}    0.00*** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
Coeff (ln_AI)  0.7672 1.1757 1.2063 3.1441 
Coeff (ln_AM)  0.9672 0.3801 0.8082 -0.0647 
P{Coeff (ln_AI) 
= Coeff 
(ln_AM) =1 }  
0.0161**  0.00 ***  0.3896   0.00 ***  
R-squared   0.8155 0.0974 0.4591 0.3989  
*** denote a significant at the 1 %     
** denote a significant at the 5 %      
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Fig. 1: Average Premium and Average Pure Premium by Age           
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